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This paper contributes to the literature by introducing the nexus between financial constraints and the 
capital-labour uptake and by considering the capital-labour ratio to overcome the problems that have 
plagued investment literature -regarding the investment-cash flow sensitivity of constrained and 
unconstrained firms- that have focused only on investment ignoring employment decisions. The 
inclusion of the employment along with the capital can provide clear evidence about firms’ decisions 
on their allocation of funds between capital and labour. To detect any possible variation in our results 
across firms we use a sample of 17,350 quoted and unquoted UK firms over the period 1994-2004 
and we estimate it applying panel data techniques. It is shown that balance sheet indicators such as 
leverage and cash flow result in lower K/L ratio, while the collateral ratio has a positive effect on the 
K/L ratio. In addition, when we differentiate the effects of the firm-specific characteristics across 
firms that are more or less financially constrained, we find that the former category exhibits a lower 
capital-labour ratio. Lastly, our results indicate that monetary policy shocks have an effect on the 















  11.   Introduction 
The analysis of the determinants of firm financial behaviour has long been a key research 
field in microeconomics. A growing number of theoretical and empirical studies have shown 
that the financial positions of firms are important for their fixed investment and employment 
decisions under imperfect financial markets. More specifically, Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen 
(1988) (hereafter FHP) investigate the impact of cash flow on investment arguing that cash 
flow tends to have a bigger effect on the investment of firms more likely to face financial 
constraints. This evidence is taken at face value for the existence of financial constraints. 
Debate over the investment cash-flow sensitivity has been fueled by the work of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) (hereafter KZ). Contrary to previous research, KZ’s results strongly suggest 
that firms that appeared less financially constrained exhibit significantly greater investment-
cash flow sensitivities than firms in the more constrained group. Adding to this debate, Pratap 
(2003) shows how a dynamic model of firm investment with financial constraints and non-
convex costs of adjustment of capital can explain these two facts. He argues that a high 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow is an indicator of financial constraints, however 
investment may be insensitive to cash flow for a subset of constrained firms due to non-
convexities in the adjustment cost. On the other hand, Cantor (1990) and Sharpe (1994) 
investigate the role of financial constraints and firm specific characteristics on firms’ 
employment behavior in economic downturns. They show that small and highly indebted 
firms experience greater volatility in their employment over the business cycle. Nickell and 
Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando (2002) examine the effect of financial pressure on 
firms’ employment decisions and find evidence of large effects of financial pressure on 
employment. Lastly, in a dynamic model of labour demand, Rendon (2001) show that in an 
environment of imperfect capital and imperfect labour markets, firms use more temporary 
contracts instead of permanent to relax financial constraints.  
Although the relevance of financial constraints on firms’ investment and employment 
decisions has been examined thoroughly, the literature has ignored the impact of capital 
market imperfections on firm-level capital-labour (K/L) ratio. This is surprising given that 
funds could be allocated differently when firms have to consider capital and labour 
simultaneously rather than independently. This evidence leads to the following questions. 
How do firm-specific characteristics and financial constraints affect the choice of firms’ K/L 
ratio? Is there evidence of an heterogeneous K/L uptake amongst firms? In examining 
diagrammatically rich data of UK manufacturing firms for the period 1994-2004 we show that 
constrained and unconstrained firms use a different level of K/L ratio. In fact, small firms face 
  2a lower capital-labour ratio in contrast with large firms. How different uses of capital-labour 
ratio between constrained and unconstrained firms are explained? In this paper, it is argued 
that it is the financial position of firms and the capital market imperfections that drive the 
heterogeneous capital-labour uptake among firms. 
Recent evidence suggests that financially constrained firms employ less capital 
(Garmaise, 2006). Garmaise develops a theoretical model of the optimal capital and labour 
management strategies for firms to undertake given the limited access to credit. He predicts 
that financially constrained firms will exhibit declining labour productivity over time, will 
have lower capital-labour ratios and will allow more employee autonomy and production in 
groups. The predictions of his model are confirmed also empirically
1. However, he doesn’t 
examine the firm-level K/L ratio in depth, neglecting a number of factors -such as the firm-
specific characteristics, the monetary policy stance and financial constraints based on firms’ 
financial health- that could affect firms’ decisions on K/L ratio.  
Having identified the gap in the literature, we seek to fill it by considering a new 
dimension of financial constraints and firms’ financial choices. In particular, we focus on the 
nexus between financial constraints and firm-level K/L ratio with emphasis on different types 
of firms
2. The contribution of the paper to the literature is twofold. First, we examine the 
behaviour of constrained and unconstrained firms in the UK regarding their decisions on K/L 
ratio. Given that a firm’s choice to use either capital or labour largely depends on its financial 
position, financial constraints become a central element. It is a common knowledge that 
external funds determine capital investment up to a point. On the other extreme, internal 
sources is the key ingredient for labour investment. Hence, it is of particular interest to 
examine how constrained and unconstrained firms allocate their total funds on K/L ratio when 
decisions on capital and labour have to be taken simultaneously. Second, the advantage of our 
approach is not only that we introduce the employment to check how firms allocate their 
funds on K/L ratio, but also we avoid the problems that have plagued previous empirical 
investment studies that have focused only on investment thus ignoring employment 
decisions
3.  
                                                 
1Owner’s characteristics, indices for the bank concentration and rejections of owner’s loan applications are considered as 
proxies for financial constraints.  
2 Firms are classified to more or less financially constrained using a wide range of criteria. There are quite a number of 
alternative approaches attempting to achieve this separation based on criteria such as the dividend payout ratio (Fazzari et al., 
1988), size and age (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990, Carpenter et al, 1994, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) and collateral ratio 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Almeida and Campello, 2004; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006). 
3 The investment model cannot give us a straight answer on the FHP (1987) and KZ (1997) debate on the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. 
 
  3Whereas the existing evidence on investment cannot provide a definitive answer, our 
approach makes a further prediction. To make our point clear we consider the following 
example. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS), we examine the decisions 
of firms on their allocation of internal funds between capital and labour. For financially 
unconstrained firms the capital-labour ratio should remain constant as their sales increase. 
Constrained firms by definition can not invest optimally in capital
4. For the latter group of 
firms the capital-labour ratio will decline. Both cases are consistent with a positive correlation 
between investment and cash flow. However, in the first case there is a zero correlation 
between cash flow and the capital-labour ratio while in the second case the correlation is 
negative.  
Thus on the question that arises from the above example as to which of the two firms can 
be characterized as a financially constrained, the investment model cannot give us a definitive 
answer since a positive correlation between capital and internal funds can be interpreted either 
way (FHP (1988) and KZ(1997) debate). Nevertheless, the introduction of the capital-labour 
ratio can help us to overcome this problem and make a more precise characterization between 
constrained and unconstrained firms.  
The FAME data set is utilized to find proxies for capital market imperfections and a 
variety of financial variables as firm-specific characteristics
5. The advantage of using such a 
rich financial data is that it allows us to test empirically Garmaise’s (2006) theory and to 
compare our results on financial constraints with the existing literature (FHP (1988), KZ 
(1997)). Additionally, our analysis addresses the effect of monetary policy indicators-
described by interest burden, on firms’ capital-labour ratio decisions. To our knowledge, this 
is the first study to present evidence of a link between capital-labour ratio and firm-specific 
characteristics under imperfect capital markets. 
Our results show that firm-specific indicators are important determinants for firm’s 
decision on capital-labour ratio. Further, when firms are divided into more and less financially 
constrainted, it is found that firms with limited access to financial markets exhibit a lower 
capital-labour ratio compared to the unconstrained firms. In addition the capital-labour ratio 
of constrained firms was found to be more sensitive to monetary policy than capital-labour 
ratio of unconstrained firms. In particular, firms were found to decrease K/L due to substantial 
debt service obligations.  
                                                 
4 This will be the case if capital investment is lumpy as suggested in the investment literature 
5 One appealing feature of these data is that the majority of firms are relatively small and not publicly traded, therefore more 
likely to face financial constraints. 
  4The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief analysis 
of the hypotheses used to form the basis of our empirical work. Section 3 illustrates a 
preliminary data analysis and presents our classification schemes. In section 4 we present our 
baseline specifications and our econometric methodology. In section 5 we discuss the 
estimation results while in section 6, some robustness tests are presented. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Testable Hypotheses 
The theoretical foundation of this paper comes from Garmaise (2006), who provides 
theoretical and empirical evidences for the capital-labour decisions of financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms. However, he studies mainly the worker-firm relationship, putting 
much less emphasis on the capital-labour decisions of firms. This discussion leads us to the 
formulation of our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Firms facing financial constraints cannot buy capital. They can only hire 
labour.  
Hypothesis 1B: Unconstrained firms can buy capital and hire labour, however capital is the 
preferred investment for them.  
 
Financial status is a vague term for describing firms’ net worth and a number of balance 
sheet indicators have been used in the literature as measures of financial healthiness (see 
Bond and Van Reenen (2006), for a survey). Guided from the theoretical and empirical 
literature on firms’ financial constraints, we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Balance sheet indicators should be important determinants on firms’ decisions 
on their allocation of internal funds between capital and labour. 
 
As noted in the introduction, investment empirical studies have focused only on 
investment- cash flow sensitivities ignoring employment decisions. Based on the inclusion of 
employment along with the capital and the presence of capital market imperfections we 
propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Financially constrained firms exhibit a higher K/L - cash flow sensitivity 
compared to the unconstrained group.  
 
  5An important aspect of this study is the consideration of a monetary shock and its effect 
on the K/L ratio. Motivated by Mojon et al. (2002) who find that changes in the level of 
interest rates have an impact on firms’ investment, we want to examine whether this holds for 
the K/L ratio.  The next hypothesis can be formulated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Capital-labour ratio should be more sensitive to monetary policy for 
constrained firms that face high interest payments. 
  
3.   Classification Schemes and data analysis  
This section illustrates the sample separation criteria along with a descriptive and 
graphical presentation of the data. The data are presented in primarily graphical form to 
illustrate variation in the cross-sectional distributions of outcomes and how these have varied 
over time. This provides a precursor to the more formal analysis of how capital-labour ratio, 
of various types of companies, responds to financial constraints.  
 
3.1. Sample Separation Criteria 
To depict responses of firms to capital market imperfections, we first have to partition 
them according to whether they are more or less likely to face financial constraints. Following 
the bulk of the literature we create three different binary variables which reflect six different 
firm characteristics i.e small, large, young, old, bank dependent and non bank dependent 
firms, using the 25 percent cut-off value. We then allow firms switch across firm categories 
over time
 6.  
Our first separation scheme is an indicator of the firm’s bank-dependence, called the mix. 
It is defined as the ratio of the firm’s short-term debt to its total debt and it was introduced by 
Kashyap et al. (1993)
7. The mix attempts to measure the extent to which a firm has to finance 
itself short term rather than long term and is therefore related to its access to long term 
finance. The higher the mix, the more bank-dependent is a firm. Thus, it is more likely this 
firm to be characterized as a constrained firm. We create a dummy MBANKi, which is equal to 
1 if firm i’s mix is in the top 75% of the distribution of the mixes of all firms belonging to the 
same industry as firm i in year t and equal to 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
6 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on firm-years rather than simply firms. See Bond and Meghir (1994), 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1998), and Guariglia (2000) for a similar approach. 
7 Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and Peersman and Smets (2005) used a closely related variable (short term debt / total short 
term debt) in their test for the presence of a bank lending channel of transmission of monetary policy and subsequently used 
by Guariglia and Mateut (2006). 
  6 Our second scheme is based on the firms’ real total assets. We generate a dummy 
variable, SMALLit, which is equal to 1 if firm i’s real assets for firm i is in the bottom 75% of 
the distribution of the real assets of all firms operating to the same industry as firm i in year t  
and equal to 0 otherwise. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) used this variable as a proxy for capital 
market access for the manufacturing sector
8. It would be expected small firms to face a 
different K/L ratio compared to their large counterpart. 
In the last scheme, firms are classified according to their age in order to measure the 
importance of a track record. An old established firm is more likely to have access in the 
capital market compared to a young and growing firm. Hence, it is more likely young firms to 
face problems of asymmetric information
9. Therefore, we create the dummy YOUNGit, which 
is equal to 1 if age for firm i is in the bottom 75%  of the distribution and equal to 0 
otherwise.  
 
3.2. Data Description and Graphical Analysis 
We construct our data set from the profit and loss, balance sheet and cash flow data 
gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the FAME database. The data set 
includes a majority of firms which are not publicly traded. This is an appealing characteristic 
of the data set as it allows our measures of capital market imperfections to display a wide 
degree of variation across observations in our sample. Having data on private as well as 
public companies is particularly valuable in our case, as the private companies are generally 
the smallest, youngest, and most bank dependent firms. They are therefore more likely than 
public companies to face financing constraints. 
Our sample is limited only to firms that operate in the manufacturing industry and we 
provide information on financial accounts and ratios for 17,350 UK manufacturing firms for 
the years 1994-2004. We impose the restriction that the firm has at least 3 consecutive time-
series observations per company, with the number of years of observations on each firm 
varying between 3 and 10. This produces an unbalanced sample of manufacturing companies. 
By allowing for both entry and exit the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates 
potential selection and survivor bias. Since some firms do not report most of the years, we 
start our empirical analysis with 14,700 firms. Finally, to control for the potential influence of 
outliers, observations in the variables that have very large dispersion are excluded
10. 
                                                 
8 Bougheas et al. (2005) and Guariglia and Mateut (2006) based their group classification on the firm’s total real assets. 
9 This classification criterion has been employed in the past by a number of researchers (Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), 
Carpenter et al (1994), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). 
10 See appendix for outliers. 
  7We now turn to the graphical illustration of the data. It is really important to depict the 
variations of the variables that the capital-labour ratio consists of (capital stock, number of 
employees). This is to confirm that our econometric results are not driven only by changes in 
capital. In other words, we want to see whether both capital and labour change across time. 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we observe that both capital and labour follow the same pattern 
across time. They both exhibit an increasing trend although capital is rising at a higher pace 
during the mid to late 90’s.  
Next the distribution of the capital-labour ratio, leverage, collateral, cash flow and interest 
burden are considered for constrained and unconstrained firms. Figure 3 indicates that the K/L 
ratio evolves differently across groups. In particular, the K/L ratio for small firms varies 
between 0.15 and 0.25 across years while the K/L ratio for large firms is consistently higher 
with the lowest value to be 0.15 and the highest to be 0.45. Leverage, which is defined as the 
ratio of total liabilities to firm’s total assets
 , is depicted in Figure 4. It can be seen that small 
firms exhibit higher levels of debt compared to large firms. Figure 5 depicts the cash flow. It 
is clear, that small firms have a higher cash flow position in contrast to large firms perhaps 
indicating that financially constrained firms feel the pressure to maintain a positive cash flow 
cushion under capital market imperfections. The ratio of tangible assets over firm’s total 
assets (collateral ratio) for small and large firms is illustrated in Figure 6. We observe that the 
level of collateral for small firms is higher compared to large firms’ collateral level. One 
would expect large firms to have high collateral ratios since they can access capital markets 
without restrictions. However, Berger and Udell (1998) found evidence that riskier firms are 
more likely to pledge collateral to access the debt financing. Finally, Figure 7 indicates, that 
small firms pay statistically and economically a significantly higher average interest on their 
debt than large firms.  
Overall, the above graphical analysis indicates that small firms characterized by a 
relatively high use of debt and stronger cash flow are associated with lower levels of K/L 
ratio. This can be seen as very preliminary evidence in favour of the hypothesis of the 
different impact of market imperfections on the K/L ratio. A very similar picture emerges by 
examining the descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
 
4.  Methodology 
This section describes the empirical approach and presents the baseline models. We first 
state our main hypothesis: financial constrained firms are likely to have lower capital-labour 
ratio compared to their unconstrained counterparts. 
  8We estimate the following static linear model: 
 
it it it it e F X y + + = γ β           (1) 
 
where i =1,2,…,N refers to a cross section of firms, t =1,2,…,T refers to time period. yit 
and Xit are the dependent variable and the vector of non financial explanatory variables for the 
firm i and year t, respectively. In particular, the dependent variable is the log of capital-labour 
ratio (K/L)it, where K is the replacement value of firm’s capital
11 and L is the number of 
employees. The vector of non financial variables consists of PRICEit, the log of real price – 
the ratio of industry variable user cost of capital to firm level wages- and SALESit, the log of 
real sales.  denotes the vector of financial variables for the firm i and year t.   is the error 
term made up of five components: 
it F it e
i ψ  is firm-specific component,  t ψ  is a time-specific 
component,  j ψ  is an industry-specific component,  jt ψ  is an industry specific component 
which varies across time and lastly  it ε  is an idiosyncratic component
12.  
We estimate the model taking a Within Group (WG) estimation approach, which treatsψ ’s 
as a firm-specific disturbance and assumes that explanatory variables andψ ’s are correlated. 
The decision between WG  and RE hinges on whether there is correlation between the 
individual effects and the included regressors. For this purpose we conduct the Hausman 
specification test (Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis is rejected indicating that the fixed 
effects estimator is more appropriate in estimating our model
13. Furthermore, to support the 
choice of the WG estimation technique, we cannot assume strict exogeneity of our regressors 
and firm-specific variables such as leverage, cash flow and collateral should not be treated as 
exogenous variables. However WG estimator may be affected by the endogeneity bias. For 
this reason the model is also estimated using the Static First-Differenced GMM
14 estimate 
which considers both the endogeneity bias and the unobserved heterogeneity problems. 
The set of financial variables that we incorporate in our model is in line with the existing 
empirical literature. More precisely, we define COLLATERALit as the ratio of tangible assets 
                                                 
11 The replacement value of capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory formula (Blundell et al.,1992; Bond and 
Meghir, 1994). See Appendix for more details. 
12 Firms are allocated to one of the following nine industrial groups: metal and metal goods; other minerals and mineral 
products; chemicals and man made fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and 
parts, other transport equipment; food, drink and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather and footwear and others (Blundell et al., 
1992)   
13 If the model is correctly specified and if individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the fixed effect 
and the random effect estimators should not be statistically different. 
14 The Arellano, Bond (1991) GMM estimation was carried out in Stata 9.2 (Roodman, 2005). 
  9to total asset. A large body of previous research points out the importance of collateral for 
debt finance
15. Moreover, we employ LEVERAGEit which is defined as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Following Heisz and LaRochelle-Cote (2005) we expect that high 
leverage firms i.e the financially vulnerable firms that face high agency costs and have high 
levels of capital constraints, will postpone their capital investment. Consequently, we would 
expect a low K/L ratio for these firms.  
The last balance sheet indicator that we include in our specification is CASH FLOWit. 
Following Benito and Hernando (2002) we define cash flow as the sum of after tax profit and 
depreciation normalized by the total assets of the company. Earlier studies show that the 
activities of more constrained firms depend on the internal funds such as cash flow (Benito 
and Hernando, 2002; FHP, 1988; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). Therefore, we would 
expect a negative relationship between cash flow and K/L ratio for the more constrained 
group of firms. 
To explore the sensitivity of firms K/L ratio stemming from the interaction between 
imperfect capital markets and firm-specific characteristics, we employ several dummy 
variables. The dummy vector (Dit) is interacted with the vector of financial variables (Fit) in 
our baseline specification.  
it it it it it e D F X y + + = γ β               (2) 
 
The dummy vector  consists of three different binary variables reflecting six different firm 
characteristics i.e small, large, young, old, more bank dependent, less bank dependent. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1. The nexus between Firm-Specific Characteristics and the K/L ratio. 
In previous work, Benito and Hernando (2002) stress the importance of firm’s balance 
sheet indicators on fixed investment decisions, inventory investment, or employment. We 
seek to test whether firm’s balance sheet indicators are important determinants of the K/L 
ratio for UK firms.  
The set of explanatory variables consist of real variables, namely the logarithm of price 
and the logarithm of sales, and three financial variables: the leverage ratio, the collateral ratio 
and the cash flow ratio. We mainly focus on the estimation results for the financial variables.  
                                                 
15 Bester (1985, 1987) shows that collateral can be used as a signaling device to separate high-risk from low-risk borrowers 
and as an incentive device to confront problems of moral hazard. Assets that are more tangible, sustain in fact more external 
financing because tangibility increases the value that can be recaptured by creditors in case of borrower’s default (Nilsen, 
2002; Almeida and Campello, 2004). 
  10Results are presented in Table 2
16. The coefficient on the control variable PRICE has a 
negative and highly significant effect on the dependent variable. More precisely, a 1% 
increases in PRICE results a 0.592% decrease in capital-labour ratio. SALES exert a negative 
impact on K/L. Firms with high SALES face a lower K/L ratio compared to those with low 
SALES.  The result is a negative correlation between SALES and K/L ratio.  
Turning to the analysis of the financial variables, the results indicate a significant effect of 
the control variables on K/L ratio. In particular, the coefficient on CASH FLOW exerts a 
negative and significant impact on the K/L ratio illustrating that firms have to decrease their 
K/L ratio. The coefficient of LEVERAGE has a negative and significant impact on the 
dependent variable. Since debt variables capture the indebtedness position of the firm and its 
financial healthiness, an increase in firm’s debt limit decreases the capital-labour ratio. 
Finally,  COLLATERAL exhibits a positive and highly significant coefficient stressing the 
importance of the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. This ratio is an important indicator of 
collateral available to support borrowing. The results obtained from this specification are 
consistent with the preliminary evidence of section 3 and are of particular importance in 
shaping the view that firm-specific characteristics such as leverage, collateral and cash flow 
are important determinants of the K/L ratio.  
Nevertheless, the estimates obtained using the WG  estimator may be affected by 
endogeneity bias. In column 2 of Table 3 we present the results of the Static First-Differenced 
GMM estimator which takes the unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity biases into 
account. The estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables are almost identical with 
those obtained using the WG estimator. The J statistic has a significance of 0.161 and the m2 
statistic shows no sign of second order serial correlation of the residual
17. Both tests suggest 
that the instruments are valid and that there is no sign of mis-specification in the model.  
 
5.2. Capital Market Imperfections, Firm-Specific Characteristics and the K/L ratio 
Next we test whether various types of firms with different balance sheet positions have an 
heterogenous K/L ratio. In other words, we want to examine - under the assumption that 
labour and capital are perfect substitutes- whether more constrained firms with weak balance 
sheets are likely to face a lower K/L ratio compared to their counterparts, indicating the 
                                                 
16 All standard errors are robust to cluster (industry) correlation to account for the fact that we have industry level variables in 
a firm level variable regression (Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002 pp.411). This may lead to under-estimated standard 
errors if correlation of the error term induced by the macro-variables is not taken into account (Moulton, 1990). 
17 The J statistic is the Sargan/Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions and the m2 statistic tests for the second order 
autocorrelation of the residuals in the first-differenced equation.  
  11substitution of capital with labour across firms. The specification in terms of the K/L ratio 
capital-labour ratio can help to overcome the problems that have plagued previous empirical 
studies
18. In contrast to previous studies we don’t only look at the investment- cash flow 
relationship but we consider simultaneously the role of capital and labour on firms’ decisions 
and their variations with the balance sheet characteristics by explicitly making the distinction 
between constrained and unconstrained firms
19. To examine our main hypotheses we divide 
firms to more and less constrained using different classification criteria such as size, age, bank 
dependency and estimate (2). 
Table 3 reports the results from the interaction between firm type dummies and financial 
variables. The first financial variable is the profitability indicator CASH FLOW. CASH FLOW 
has been used in previous studies to reflect firm’s internal funds between constrained and 
unconstrained firms. However, these studies were not able to give us a definitive answer on 
the distinction between constrained and unconstrained firms since a positive correlation 
between capital and internal funds can be interpreted either way
20. By considering firms’ 
employment decisions we use the K/L ratio and we seek an answer on the distinction between 
constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Now turning to our results, the WG estimations are presented in the first three columns of 
Table 3. The coefficients on CASH FLOW are negative and statistically significant not only 
for constrained firms but also for large and less bank dependent firms. However, it is likely 
that the WG estimator suffers from endogeneity bias. When we estimate our model using the 
First-Differenced GMM estimator the results (columns 4, 5, 6) change dramatically. The 
group of unconstrained firms exhibits a zero correlation between cash flow and the capital-
labour ratio while for the constrained group of firms the correlation is negative. When a firm 
faces difficulties in obtaining external finance its employment should be more sensitive to the 
availability of its internal funds. Constrained firms can not invest optimally in capital due to 
some technological impediment to adjusting capital quickly (this will be the case if capital 
investment is lumpy as suggested in the investment literature
21) thus the firm will satisfy 
demand using labour more intensively.  
                                                 
18 FHP(1988), KZ(1997) debate. 
19 As it was emphasized in the introductory part the investment model cannot give us a straight answer on the FHP (1987, 
KZ(1997) debate. 
20 FHP (1988) find that more financially constrained firms exhibit significantly greater investment-cash flow sensitivities 
than firms that appeared more financially constrained,  on the other hand KZ (1997) find the opposite result. Firms that 
appeared less constrained have a greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
21 Plant-level investment is likely to be ‘lumpy’ from year to year due to the discrete nature of some capital purchases such as 
new structures or large pieces of equipment. These plant-level effects may translate into ‘lumpiness’ at the firm-level if the 
plant is large relative to the firm. 
  12 From an econometric point of view, the abovementioned result indicates that the WG 
estimator suffers from endogeneity bias. Overall, the result postulates a decline in constrained 
firms’ capital-labour ratio. This finding, in contrast with the investment financing literature, 
provides us with a more precise distinction between constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Next, we observe that the coefficients of LEVERAGE exhibit a negative and significant 
sign for constrained firms, which is not the case for their unconstrained counterparts. The 
coefficients of LEVERAGE  retain their significance even when we perform the First-
Differenced GMM estimation method. This result is consistent with the view that higher levels 
of debt may deter creditors from offering further credit for firms that are vulnerable, meaning 
a limited access on external finance for constrained firms. It is a stylized fact that firms have 
to raise external finance in order to finance their investment projects. However, when a firm is 
highly indebted it’s extremely difficult and expensive to obtain outside finance. Thus the 
higher the debt burden, the higher is the cost of external finance. Cantor (1990) and 
Calomiris, Orphanides and Sharpe (1994) find that increases in leverage at the firm level are 
associated with increased volatility in capital expenditures. In other words, highly leveraged 
firms have to postpone their fixed investment.  
Turning to the COLLATERAL variable, the estimated coefficients have a positive sign, 
which is significant at the one percent level for both constrained and unconstrained firms. 
These results are in line with Berger and Udell’s (1990) findings that collateral is an 
important factor, reducing the riskiness of a loan by giving the financial institution a claim on 
a tangible asset.  Although, the coefficients are higher for constrained firms the tests of 
equality of coefficients on collateral point out that the effects of the collateral are the same 
across different group of firms. Overall, the J and m2 tests do not indicate any problems with 
the specification of the model and the choice of the instruments.  
Summarizing our results, we find that balance sheet variables are important determinants 
of K/L ratio only for constrained firms.  In particular, the WG and the Static First-Differenced 
GMM estimates provide us with evidence that firms that face a different degree of capital 
market imperfections substitute capital with labour. In other words, small, young and more 
bank dependent firms that have limited access in debt market exhibit greater sensitivities 
regarding the capital-labour ratio. More importantly, we avoid the problems of previous 
studies by clearly distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained firms and we find 
that cash flow has a bigger effect on constrained firms.  
 
 
  135.3. Interest Burden, Financial Constraints and the K/L ratio 
Interest burden is used as an indicator for the monetary policy and is defined as the ratio 
of interest payments to total debt. The major advantage of this ratio is that it allows us to 
examine the impact of monetary policy on different types of firms. Some firms are more 
likely to incur a high interest payment relative to their total debt because they are financially 
weak and risky with low levels of collateral
22. Although this indicator is not controlled 
exogenously by the Bank of England (it is endogenous in the sense that it reflects the financial 
conditions of firms as well as the interest rate), it does provide evidence about the extent of 
the asymmetric information problem in the financial transactions given firm heterogeneity 
(Bougheas et al., 2005). 
 We choose to use the firm-specific apparent interest rate in order to exploit its cross-
sectional information and to examine whether constrained firms that pay a higher cost for 
their external debt, face a lower K/L ratio. According to the theory of the financial accelerator 
(Bernanke et al., 1999), the interest paid by firms with weak balance sheets should react more 
to monetary policy shocks than the interest paid by firms with strong balance sheets. For this 
purpose we interact firm type dummies with the interest burden variable. The results are 
reported in Table 5.  
In column 1, 5 of Table 4 we present the estimates of the augmented -by the interest paid 
by firms’- equation (1).  The coefficients on the control variables and the balance sheet 
indicators remain statistically and economically significant. We can see that the coefficient on 
ID is negative and highly significant: interest burden clearly have information about 
differences in payment obligations among firms embedded in it. It also appears that the K/L 
ratio responds negatively and strongly to firm-specific apparent interest rate, indicating that 
firms with high ID face a lower K/L ratio compared to those with low ID.   
Next we report the results from the interactions between firm type dummies and the 
interest burden. Columns 2, 3, 4 report the estimates obtained using the WG  estimator. 
Overall, we do not find compelling evidence that the interest rate cost of small firms reacts 
stronger than that of large sized firms. However, when we apply the First-Differenced GMM 
estimator (that takes into account the endogeneity and heterogeneity biases) the estimated 
results differ significantly from those obtained using the WG  estimator. The coefficients 
associated with the interacted interest burden show strong evidence that K/L ratio of 
                                                 
22 Kashyap and Stein (1994) show that small and medium sized firms may be unable to access other markets for funds and 
therefore have a certain dependence on banks for external sources of funds while Mojon et al. (2002) find that the interest 
rate paid by small firms is on average higher than that paid by larger firms.  
  14constrained firms is more sensitive to the interest burden than K/L ratio of unconstrained 
firms. Moreover, the results support the validity of the instruments and the absence of the 
second-order serial correlation. From that we can see that the WG estimator is seriously 
affected by the endogeneity bias.  
One main implication can be highlighted from our results. Constrained firms do pay a 
higher cost for their external debt and they have to alter their K/L ratio due to the high interest 
payment obligations. According to the First-Differenced GMM estimation results, capital-
labour ratio is found to be more sensitive on the monetary policy for constrained firms.  
 
6.  Robustness Checks 
We present various robustness tests in order to reinforce our previous results. Firstly, we 
want to examine whether our results remain persistent when we employ a dynamic estimation. 
Secondly, to test the robustness of the cash flow results, we regress the specification 
excluding the distressed firms
23. Finally, we replace capital stock with fixed assets.   
 
6.1. Dynamic Estimation of the main models 
We employ a dynamic estimation to examine whether firms’ decisions on K/L ratio 
change during the years. The rational of estimating our models in a dynamic panel data 
setting, can be attributed to the fact that both financial markets and labour markets are 
imperfect. Given the speed and the time of capital and labour adjustment, we estimate our 
models employing a dynamic approach.  
All our variables retain their significance in most of the cases while the results support the 
validity of the instruments and the absence of second-order serial correlation. The main 
findings from the Dynamic First-Differenced GMM estimations (Tables 5, 6) are in line with 
those reported in section 5. It is confirmed that firm-specific characteristics such as leverage, 
collateral and cash flow are important determinants of the K/L ratio. More precisely, under 
the assumption that capital and labour are perfect substitutes our findings support the 
prediction that constrained firms substitute capital with labour showing that those firms are 
typically less capital intensive. Moreover, the results on cash flow and the K/L relationship 
are statistically and economically significant pointing out the negative correlation between 
cash flow and K/L ratio and clearly indicating the distinction between constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Also, the capital-labour ratio was found more sensitive to monetary 
                                                 
23 Allayannis and Mozumbar (2004) use negative cash flow observations as a proxy for distressed firms. 
  15policy for constrained firms confirming that financial accelerator phenomena play an 
important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for the UK. 
 
6.2. Negative Cash-Flow observations and the K/L ratio 
Evidence from our data and our econometric estimations suggest that CASH FLOW   has 
a negative effect on capital-labour ratio for constrained firms. To examine whether our 
findings on cash flow-K/L ratio relationship are driven by the fact that a firm is in sufficiently 
bad shape, we follow Allayannis’ and Mozumbar’s (2004) technique. They investigate the 
role of negative cash flow observations on investment decisions estimating investment models 
including positive cash flow observations and all the cash flow observations 
interchangeably
24.  
Table 7 presents the estimates of equation (2) when only positive cash flow observations 
are included. The coefficients associated with the cash flow variable are now much higher for 
constrained firms. These evidences reveal that the cash flow results for constrained firms 
obtained in table 4, are not affected by the inclusion of the distressed firms (proxied by 
negative cash flow). In fact, they strongly support the importance of CASH FLOW for the 
constrained entrepreneurs in connection with the capital-labour ratio.   
 
6.3. An Alternative Measure of Capital Stock 
Since part of our analysis depends on the capital-labour ratio, it is important to check 
whether our results hinge on how finely we construct capital. Up to this point we have used 
replacement value of capital stock as the firm’s capital. However, the use of the perpetual 
inventory formula leads to a substantial loss of observations in our sample.  
Taking into consideration the peculiarity of the replacement value of capital stock, we 
replace this variable with the fixed assets. Following Mackay and Phillips (2006) we define 
fixed assets as the sum of tangible assets, intangible assets, and investment and other fixed 
assets. After reestimating equation (1), (2) and the augmented – by the interest paid by firms’- 
equation it can be shown that results remain largely unchanged compared with those obtained 
using the replacement value of capital stock as our preferred capital variable. Results are 
presented in Tables 8, 9. Thus, these findings provide assurance that our main results are 
robust to the use of replacement values of capital stock. 
 
                                                 
24 Distressed firms as proxied by negative cash flow observations have lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than non-
distressed firms (Allayannis and Mozumbar, 2004). 
  167.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we use a panel of a large number of UK manufacturing firms over the period 
1994-2004. We estimate a model in which the ratio of capital to labour is the dependent 
variable. The first novel aspect of our study is that we examine the nexus between firm-
specific characteristics and firms’ decisions on capital-labour ratio. In particular, we study 
whether firm-specific characteristics such as leverage, collateral and cash flow affect firms’ 
decision on capital-labour ratio.  Another novel aspect of our work is that we test the impact 
of capital market imperfections and balance sheet indicators on K/L ratio. This allows us to 
measure the variability in the financial choices of firms given the financial constraints that 
firms face. Since a positive correlation between capital and internal funds can be interpreted 
differently in the investment-cash flow model we introduce the capital-labour ratio to 
overcome this problem
25. Next, we consider the effects of monetary policy indicators on 
firms’ capital-labour ratio for firms that face liquidity constraints and for firms that do not. 
Lastly, we evaluate the effects of cash flow on K/L ratio excluding distress firms. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that balance sheet indicators are 
important determinants of firm’s capital-labour decisions. Second, when firms are classified 
on the basis of their different characteristics we find evidence that firms with a higher degree 
of capital market imperfections (more financially constrained) face a lower capital-labour 
ratio in contrast with the unconstrained firms. Third, the results indicate that financially 
constrained firms exhibit a higher K/L - cash flow sensitivity compared to the unconstrained 
firms. Fourth, we show that capital-labour ratio of constrained firms is more sensitive to the 
interest burden than K/L ratio of unconstrained firms postulating that constrained firms have 
to alter (significantly) their K/L ratio due to high interest payment obligations. Our results are 
robust to estimating our empirical models employing a Dynamic First-Differenced GMM 
approach, to excluding distressed firms from our sample and to replacing capital stock with 
fixed assets. The results strongly suggest that, it is the financial market imperfections and the 
limited access to capital markets for particular types of firms that make them to substitute 




                                                 
25 FHP (1988) find that more financially constrained firms exhibit significantly greater investment-cash flow sensitivities 
than firms that appeared more financially constrained,  on the other hand KZ (1997) find the opposite result. Firms that 
appeared less constrained have a greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
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7  Appendix 
 
7.1 Data Sources 
 
The firm-level data that we use is the FAME database from Bureau Van Dijk. The source of the 
industrial-level data is the STAN OECD database. 
 




Replacement Value of Capital Stock (K): It is constructed using the traditional perpetual inventory 
method (Blundell et al., 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994). Since the book values of fixed capital for the 
first year of observation for each firm are at historical prices we multiply the initial book value of 
fixed capital by a factor to account for historical inflation to get replacement values for the initial 
value of the capital stock. The capital (end of period) of future years is then obtained by the perpetual 
inventory formula.     
1
1
1 ) 1 (
+
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K K δ  
Employment (L): Total number of employees.  
 
Total Real Sales (Sales): It is the log of total company sales, deflated by the GDP deflator. 
 
Cash-Flow: It is defined as the sum of after tax profit and depreciation normalized on the total assets 
of the company, deflated by the GDP deflator. 
 
Leverage: Is the ratio of total liabilities to real total assets. 
 
  19Collateral: It is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to the real total assets. 
 
Mix: It is defined as the ratio of the firm’s short-term debt to its total debt. 
Age:  Date of Incorporation 
 
Size:  It is the log of company assets, deflated by the GDP deflator 
 
Base rate: It is calculated by adding the percentage changes in the base rate to the previous year value 
starting from base year, 1994=100. 
 
Average company wage (Wages): Total employee remuneration divided by number of employees. 
 
User cost of capital (UC): Based on the contribution by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), we construct the 









































, ) 1 ( ) 1 ( δ δ τ  
where j indicates the number of industries in the manufacturing sector and t the time period. PI,j,t and 
Pj,t are the industry specific prices of investment goods and output.τ  is the highest marginal tax rate 
on corporate profits, it is the base rate (we prefer to use the base rate rather than a firm specific 
interest rate), bt are yields on benchmark public sector bonds of around 10 years maturity,  i δ is 
the average depreciation rate in the particular industry divided by the fixed assets. Dl/Dj+Ej 
and Ej/Dj+Ej are respectively the average percentage of debt finance and equity finance in the 
particular industry.  t i ) 1 ( τ − [Dj/(Dj+Ej)]+lt[Ej/(Dj+Ej)] is the industry –specific required rate 
of return on capital and   ) 1 ( j δ − ( PI,j,t+1/PI,t ) the capital gain on the fraction of capital left 
over after depreciation.  
Δ
 
Price: User cost of capital divided by the average company wage. 
 
Interest Burden (ID): Is the ratio of interest payments to total debt, deflated by the GDP deflator. 
 
Deflators: The capital stock and fixed assets are deflated using the implicit price deflator for gross 
fixed capital formation. Other variables are deflated using the aggregate GDP deflator. 
 
Outliers: We trim 0.5 percent of observations both from above and the below to remove the outliers 




Price of Investment Goods (PI,j,t): Is the gross fixed capital formation 
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  227.5. Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 















K/L it  0.292  0.226  0.425  0.289 0.296 0.281 0.351 
  (0.522)  (0.449)  (0.624)  (0.491) (0.580) (0.526) (0.490) 
Priceit  2.104  2.079  2.152  2.102 2.109 2.122 1.979 
  (4.794)  (3.670)  (6.393)  (4.872) (4.592) (5.080) (1.756) 
Salesit  199.182  78.559  385.864  171.748 275.302 195.810 225.615 
  (384.573) (96.298)  (552.447)  (347.578) (463.898) (383.119) (395.104) 
Leverageit  15.702  17.041  11.317  16.747 12.558 16.211 12.177 
  (14.347) (15.210)  (9.854)  (15.214) (10.745) (14.806)  (9.948) 
Collateralit  26.469  26.262  27.151  25.948 28.019 25.407 33.639 
  (17.430) (17.506)  (17.163)  (17.566) (16.927) (17.119) (17.821) 
Cash Flowit  0.112  0.121  0.089  0.118 0.098 0.115 0.097 
  (0.171)  (0.183)  (0.128)  (0.182) (0.138) (0.174) (0.150) 
IDit  0.092  0.100  0.068  0.094 0.085 0.095 0.080 
  (0.208)  (0.215)  (0.186)  (0.211) (0.199) (0.220) (0.162) 
Observations  75267  48982  26183  54100 21162 65918  9322 
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The subscript i indexes firms, and the 
subscript t, time, where t = 1994-2004. SMALLit which is equal to 1 if firm i’s real assets for firm i is in the bottom 75% of the 
distribution of the real assets of all firms operating to the same industry as firm i in year t  and equal to 0 otherwise. YOUNGit is 
equal to 1 for firms in the lower 75 percent of their age distribution in year t, and 0, otherwise. MBANKit which is equal to 1 if 
firm i’s mix is in the top 75% of the distribution of the mixes of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t and 
equal to 0 otherwise. K/L it is the firm’s capital-labour ratio and Priceit is the ratio of industry variable user cost of capital to firm-
level wages. 
 
Table 2: Firm-Specific Characteristics and the K/L ratio 
Dependent variable: K/Lit  WITHIN GROUPS  GMM-DIF 
Priceit  -0.592*** -0.558*** 
 (17.2)  (8.36) 
Salesit  -0.618*** -0.531*** 
 (31.2)  (4.10) 
Cash Flowit  -0.139*** -0.255** 
 (3.50)  (2.09) 
Leverageit  -0.022** -0.100*** 
 (2.55)  (5.53) 
Collateralit  0.026*** 0.036*** 
 (30.2)  (4.93) 
Constant  1.177***  
 (9.89)   
Observations  16456 10305 
No of Firms  4597 2819 
R-squared  0.54  
m1   -9.42 
m2   0.137 
Sargan   0.161 
Instruments    t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all 
specifications. m1 and m2  are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributes as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
  23Table 3: Effects of Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Capital Market Imperfections 
















Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications. Dummy is a dummy variable that 
represents SMALLit, YOUNGi, MBANKi. SMALLit, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the realassets for firm i is in the 75% bottom of the distribution 
in period t and equal to 0 otherwise. YOUNGi is a dummy  equal to 1 if age for firm i is in the bottom 75% of the distribution and equal to 0 
otherwise. MBANKi,  which is equal to 1 if mix for firm i is in the top 75% of the distribution and equal to 0 otherwise. (1-Dummy) is a dummy 
variable that represents LARGEit, OLDi, LBANKi. LARGEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the realassets for firm i is in the 25% top of the 
distribution in period t and equal to 0 otherwise. OLDi is a dummy equal to 1 if age for firm i is in the top 25% of the distribution and equal to 0 
otherwise. LBANKi,  which is equal to 1 if mix for firm i is in the bottom 25% of the distribution and equal to 0 otherwise. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
























Dependency  Age 
(5)  (6) 
Priceit  -0.595*** -0.594*** -0.591*** -0.596*** -0.555*** -0.581*** 
 (17.3)  (17.3)  (17.2)  (10.9)  (9.87)  (11.8) 
Salesit  -0.631*** -0.618*** -0.618*** -0.608*** -0.513*** -0.583*** 
 (32.4)  (31.1)  (31.2)  (6.10)  (5.12)  (7.62) 
Cash Flowit*Dummyit  -0.091** -0.169***  -0.116***  -0.194* -0.353***  -0.186** 
 (1.98)  (3.70)  (2.73)  (1.90)  (3.32)  (2.26) 
Cash Flowit*(1-Dummyit)  -0.118* -0.046  -0.254***  0.108  0.039  -0.168 
  (1.88) (0.67) (3.63) (0.35) (0.36) (0.62) 
Leverageit*Dummyit  -0.049*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.212*** -0.127**  -0.101* 
 (5.40)  (3.24)  (2.68)  (3.53)  (2.01)  (1.95) 
Leverageit*(1-Dummyit)  0.041*** 0.003  -0.020  -0.090  0.139*  -0.038 
  (4.04) (0.22) (1.61) (1.42) (1.90) (0.50) 
Collateralit*Dummyit  0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 
 (28.0)  (26.4)  (29.7)  (7.52)  (5.84)  (6.46) 
Collateralit*(1-Dummyit)  0.028*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.028*** 
  (28.0) (15.0) (26.2) (8.49) (2.81) (4.44) 
Constant  1.223*** 1.208*** 1.184***       
 (10.4)  (9.75)  (10.0)       
Observations  16456 16456 16456 10305 10305 10305 
No of Firms  4597 4597 4597 2819 2819 2819 
R-squared  0.55 0.54 0.54       
m1        -11.13 -9.89 -10.43 
m2      0.099  0.155  0.236 
Sargan      0.089  0.115  0.590 
Instruments      t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1; Δt-2 
F-test of equality of coef. 
on collateral 









Prob>F=0.004  Prob>F=0.144 
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interacted with the Interest Burden 










































Priceit  -0.616*** -0.616*** -0.617***  -0.616***  -0.563*** -0.597*** -0.596***  -0.586*** 
  (11.4) (11.4) (11.4)  (11.4)  (7.69) (8.18) (8.15)  (7.89) 
Salesit  -0.684*** -0.684*** -0.684***  -0.682***  -0.588*** -0.669*** -0.657***  -0.638*** 
  (27.1) (27.0) (27.1)  (27.0)  (6.29) (6.71) (7.18)  (7.17) 
Cash Flowit  -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134***  -0.134***  -0.358*** -0.301*** -0.305***  -0.305*** 
  (2.69) (2.69) (2.66)  (2.70)  (3.51) (2.84) (3.16)  (3.07) 
Leverageit  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  -0.003 -0.086*** -0.090*** -0.092***  -0.090*** 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)  (0.27)  (3.26) (3.33) (3.38)  (3.39) 
Collateralit  0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027***  0.027***  0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***  0.025*** 
  (23.6) (23.6) (23.5)  (23.7)  (5.65) (5.55) (5.76)  (5.90) 
IDit  -0.238***       -0.196***      
  (6.53)       (5.98)      
IDit*(Dummyit)   -0.238***  -0.260***  -0.232***   -0.199***  -0.214***  -0.169*** 
   (5.59)  (5.54)  (6.37)   (4.98)  (4.94)  (5.97) 
IDit *(1-Dummyit)   -0.234***  -0.183***  -0.342***    0.276  0.162  -0.023 
   (5.95)  (3.16)  (3.55)   (1.10)  (1.49)  (0.073) 
Constant  1.515*** 1.515*** 1.511***  1.507***         
  (8.68) (8.69) (8.67)  (8.64)         
Observations  8951 8951 8951  8951         
No of Firms  3063 3063 3063  3063         
R-squared  0.59 0.59 0.59  0.59         
m1        -7.74  -7.57  -7.77  -7.76 
m2        0.372  0.259  0.307  0.350 
Sargan        0.052  0.047  0.076  0.057 
Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications.  m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a 
test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributes as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. 
Instruments        t-1; t-2; t-3; 
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3; 
Δt-1 















 Table 5: Effects of Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Capital Market Imperfections: 
















K/Li(t-1)  0.180*** 0.198*** 0.200***  0.215*** 
  (8.79) (9.03) (9.72)  (9.51) 
Priceit  -0.689*** -0.736*** -0.762***  -0.745*** 
  (-11.1) (-13.9) (-14.6)  (-13.5) 
Salesit  -0.684*** -0.784*** -0.840***  -0.811*** 
  (-6.96) (-10.3) (-10.7)  (-10.0) 
Cash Flowit  -0.917***      
  (-3.34)      
Cash Flowit*Dummyit   -0.769***  -0.692***  -0.558** 
   (-3.10)  (-3.16)  (-2.17) 
Cash Flowit*(1-Dummyit)   -0.590  0.362 -0.456 
   (-1.60)  (1.34) (-1.53) 
Leverageit  -0.079***      
  (-3.90)      
Leverageit*Dummyit   -0.095**  -0.074***  -0.076* 
   (-2.03)  (-2.69)  (-1.94) 
Leverageit*(1-Dummyit)   -0.030  -0.025  -0.054 
   (-0.56)  (-1.54)  (-0.93) 
Collateralit  0.038***      
  (8.41)      
Collateralit*Dummyit   0.022***  0.027***  0.024*** 
   (3.67)  (5.33)  (5.56) 
Collateralit*(1-Dummyit)   0.028***  0.030***  0.024*** 
   (5.29)  (5.84) (4.81) 
Observations  8314 8314 8314  8314 
No of Firms  2360 2360 2360  2360 
m1  -11.35 -12.86 -12.65  -12.28 
m2  0.095 0.111 0.129  0.175 
Sargan  0.065 0.084 0.082  0.134 
Instruments  t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;  








Notes:  All specifications were estimated using a Dynamic GMM first-differenced specification. The figures 
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all 
specifications.  m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the 









  26Table 6: Effects of Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Capital Market Imperfections 
interacted with the Interest Burden: Dynamic GMM First-Differenced Estimation 
 


















K/Li(t-1)  0.152*** 0.154***  0.150***  0.155*** 
 (7.37)  (7.42)  (7.33)  (7.30) 
Priceit  -0.769*** -0.757***  -0.779***  -0.783*** 
 (8.69)  (9.82)  (8.39)  (8.72) 
Salesit  -0.875*** -0.861***  -0.899***  -0.909*** 
 (8.70)  (11.1)  (8.50)  (9.31) 
Cash Flowit  -0.433** -0.406** -0.302*  -0.322* 
  (2.21) (2.06)  (1.69)  (1.76) 
Leverageit  -0.070** -0.070**  -0.071***  -0.069** 
  (2.49) (2.58)  (2.60)  (2.39) 
Collateralit  0.036*** 0.035***  0.034***  0.035*** 
  (9.62) (9.33)  (9.58)  (9.45) 
IDit  -0.149***      
  (3.30)      
IDit*(Dummyit)   -0.197***  -0.249***  -0.145*** 
   (2.69)  (4.57)  (3.26) 
IDit *(1-Dummyit)   -0.066  -0.012  -0.138* 
   (0.90)  (0.46)  (1.74) 
Observations  3925 3925  3925  3925 
No of Firms  1386 1386  1386  1386 
m1  -8.62 -9.03  -8.24  -8.32 
m2  0.296 0.307  0.273  0.276 
Sargan  0.370 0.186  0.227  0.533 
Instruments  t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a Dynamic GMM first-differenced specification. The figures reported 
in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications. m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, 













  27Table 7: Effects of Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Capital Market Imperfections: 
Excluding Negative Cash flow 




























(4)  (6) 
Priceit  -0.607***  -0.606*** -0.604*** -0.532***  -0.567*** -0.609*** 
 (14.6)  (14.5)  (14.5)  (8.13) (9.25)  (10.3) 
Salesit  -0.598***  -0.582*** -0.582*** -0.503***  -0.554*** -0.659*** 
 (26.8)  (25.8)  (25.9)  (4.90) (6.29)  (7.33) 
Cash Flowit*Dummyit  -0.540***  -0.658*** -0.584*** -0.540***  -0.738*** -0.456*** 
 (9.95)  (11.7)  (10.9)  (5.22) (6.63)  (3.94) 
Cash Flowit*(1-Dummyit)  -0.547*** -0.429***  -0.731***  0.015  -0.045  -0.252 
  (6.54) (4.32)  (7.36) (0.042)  (0.26)  (1.30) 
Leverageit*Dummyit  -0.039*** -0.025**  -0.016*  -0.220*** -0.070**  -0.113*** 
  (4.22)  (2.42) (1.83) (5.90)  (2.34) (5.49) 
Leverageit*(1-Dummyit)  0.040*** 0.007  -0.009 -0.195***  0.143* -0.084** 
  (3.79)  (0.49) (0.72) (4.37)  (1.68) (2.38) 
Collateralit*Dummyit  0.026***  0.027*** 0.026*** 0.019***  0.033*** 0.027*** 
 (27.9)  (26.3)  (29.9)  (5.02) (5.18)  (5.27) 
Collateralit*(1-Dummyit)  0.028***  0.024*** 0.027*** 0.020***  0.022*** 0.023*** 
  (28.9) (15.2)  (26.5)  (7.78) (3.20)  (4.39) 
Constant  1.078*** 1.004***  1.004***       
 (7.62)  (7.03)  (7.01)       
Observations  14053 14053  14053  7824  7824  7824 
No of Firms  4274  4274 4274 2455  2455 2455 
R-squared  0.58 0.57  0.57       
m1       -8.14  -8.37  -8.02 
m2       0.320  0.416  0.452 
Sargan       0.094  0.368  0.131 
Instruments       t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1  Δt-1; Δt-2 
Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications.  m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributes as chi-square under the null of instrument 
validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. 










F-test=2.50  F-test=1.52 













  28Table 8: Firm-Specific Characteristics and the K/L ratio: Fixed Assets- An alternative 
capital variable 










































Priceit  -0.582*** -0.584*** -0.583***  -0.583***  -0.499*** -0.534*** -0.529***  -0.485*** 
  (29.4) (29.9) (29.4)  (29.5)  (7.05) (10.4) (12.7)  (9.57) 
Salesit  -0.609*** -0.622*** -0.609***  -0.610***  -0.398*** -0.563*** -0.550***  -0.451*** 
  (44.1) (45.7) (44.1)  (44.1)  (2.74) (5.28) (6.48)  (4.26) 
Cash Flowit  -0.457***       -1.760***      
  (16.1)       (3.50)      
Cash Flowit*Dummyit   -0.361***  -0.471***  -0.444***   -0.140*  -0.204**  -0.238** 
   (12.1)  (15.0)  (15.0)   (1.76)  (2.53)  (2.42) 
Cash Flowit*(1-Dummyit)   -0.477***  -0.398***  -0.534***  -0.473  -0.082  -0.433 
   (8.62)  (6.88)  (8.22)   (1.02)  (0.87)  (1.00) 
Leverageit  -0.085***       -0.057***      
  (12.9)       (3.19)      
Leverageit*Dummyit   -0.130***  -0.088***  -0.089***   -0.302***  -0.146***  -0.135*** 
   (18.3)  (11.1)  (13.4)   (5.20)  (3.12)  (2.74) 
Leverageit*(1-Dummyit)   0.039***  -0.075***  -0.059***   -0.196***  -0.025 -0.083 
   (4.37)  (6.66)  (5.88)   (2.67)  (0.41)  (0.98) 
Collateralit  0.032***       0.011**      
  (51.5)       (2.47)      
Collateralit*Dummyit   0.032***  0.034***  0.032***   0.023***  0.027***  0.024*** 
   (49.5)  (45.2)  (51.0)   (3.89)  (4.73)  (4.50) 
Collateralit*(1-Dummyit)   0.035***  0.029***  0.032***   0.024***  0.018***  0.023*** 
   (47.3)  (25.6)  (43.4)   (5.69)  (3.33)  (3.46) 
Constant  0.949*** 0.995*** 0.951***  0.953***         
  (11.7) (12.4) (11.7)  (11.7)         
Observations  52603 52603 52599  52603  32138 32138 32135  32138 
No of Firms  10687 10687 10686  10687  7907  7906  7907  7907 
R-squared  0.38 0.41 0.38  0.38         
m1        -6.61  -14.19  -14.38  -12.57 
m2        0.042  0.031  0.053  0.051 
Sargan        0.126  0.092  0.418  0.848 
Instruments        t-1; t-2; t-3; 
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3; 
Δt-1 
t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1 
Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications.  m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a 
test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributes as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. 
F-test of equality of coef. 
on collateral 








F-t=2.17  F-t=0.06 









  29Table 9: Effects of Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Capital Market Imperfections 
interacted with the Interest Burden:  Fixed Assets- An alternative capital variable 










































Priceit  -0.610*** -0.610*** -0.610***  -0.610***  -0.703*** -0.672*** -0.711***  -0.650*** 
  (-21.2) (-21.2) (-21.2)  (-21.2)  (-11.2) (-10.1) (-10.9)  (-10.0) 
Salesit  -0.659*** -0.660*** -0.659***  -0.660***  -0.844*** -0.790*** -0.846***  -0.763*** 
  (-36.7) (-36.8) (-36.7)  (-36.7)  (-7.40) (-6.25) (-7.08)  (-6.53) 
Cash Flowit  -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.378***  -0.382***  -0.873*** -0.927*** -1.012***  -0.689** 
  (-9.02) (-8.76) (-8.96)  (-9.49)  (-2.96) (-2.85) (-3.35)  (-2.29) 
Leverageit  -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069***  -0.069***  -0.054** -0.197** -0.218**  -0.064*** 
  (-7.41) (-7.36) (-7.39)  (-7.43)  (-2.52) (-2.44) (-2.56)  (-2.86) 
Collateralit  0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***  0.030***  0.036*** 0.032*** 0.031***  0.036*** 
  (38.5) (38.4) (38.4)  (38.4)  (5.42) (4.62) (4.33)  (5.82) 
IDit  -0.385***       -0.231***      
  (-7.40)       (-5.42)      
IDit*(Dummyit)    0.427***  -0.401*** -0.404***    -0.223***  -0.240*** -0.192*** 
   (-6.04)  (-5.73)  (-8.74)   (-4.73)  (-5.45)  (-4.23) 
IDit *(1-Dummyit)   -0.224***  -0.343***  -0.272    0.542  -0.098  0.159 
   (-5.25)  (-5.82)  (-1.58)   (1.29)  (-1.39)  (0.44) 
Constant  1.256***  1.263***  1.259***  1.263***       
  (11.6) (11.7) (11.6)  (11.7)         
Observations  28141 28141 28141  28141  15032 15032 15032  15032 
No of Firms  7491 7491 7491  7491  4739 4739 4739  4739 
R-squared  0.45 0.45 0.45  0.45         
m1        -10.61  -10.83  -11.06  -10.49 
m2        0.069  0.082  0.108  0.092 
Sargan        0.220 
Notes: The figures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Time 
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all specifications.  m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributes as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. 
0.095  0.209  0.194 
Instruments        t-1; t-2; t-3; 
Δt-1
t-1; t-2; t-3;   t-1; t-2; t-3;  t-1; t-2; t-3;  
Δt-1  Δt-1 Δt-1
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